

Does a satisfactory provision of public goods strengthen democratic legitimacy in developing countries?

Evidence from Latin America

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Aims and Scope

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Context

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Latin America & the Caribbean:

- ▶ Continuous improvement in economic and human development indicators in the last two decades
→ increasing individual welfare, larger provision of public goods


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
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Figure 1. Socio-economic indicators for the world and Latin America & the Caribbean, 2000-2019. *Source:* World Bank (2020)



(a) GDP per capita



(b) Poverty rate (at \$5.50 a day, 2011 PPP)


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
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(c) Government expenditure on education



(d) Current health expenditure

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- ▶ Continuous improvement in economic and human development indicators in the last two decades
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- ▶ However, income distribution has not improved during the last quinquennium ↯ lack of provision of public goods that addresses social issues

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Latin America & the Caribbean:

- ▶ Continuous improvement in economic and human development indicators in the last two decades
→ increasing individual welfare, larger provision of public goods
- ▶ However, income distribution has not improved during the last quinquennium $\leftrightarrow$ lack of provision of public goods that addresses social issues
- ▶ Worsening of income inequality and higher expectation of quality of life →
 - ▶ Increasing citizen unrest toward who represent their interests (political class)
 - ▶ Serious debate about regime legitimacy and quality of democracy in Latin America

Aims and Scope

Context

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

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Figure 2. Normalized Democracy Index (2010=100) by world regions, 2010-2019. *Source:* Economist Intelligence Unit (2019)





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

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To assess the impact of citizen satisfaction with the provision of public goods on regime legitimacy in 18 Latin American countries, which are sorted according to the Democracy Index 2017

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To assess the impact of citizen satisfaction with the provision of public goods on regime legitimacy in 18 Latin American countries, which are sorted according to the Democracy Index 2017

1. A broader definition of public goods is explored: traditional public services (i.e., infrastructure, education, and health) + global public goods (e.g., freedom of speech, human rights protection, climate change concerns)
2. Acceptance and confidence in the decisions and outcomes reached by the political decision-making is used as a legitimacy paradigm

Literature Review

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Attitudes toward democracy and regime legitimacy

1. Regime legitimacy: attribute of the democratic state that generates sufficient citizen consensus to obey its authority without coercion → obedience into adherence, belief in authority (Bobbio et al., 1998; Weber, 1964)

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3. Distinction between Formal and Material legitimacy (Nun, 2002; Rúa, 2013):

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4. Exercise of power and provision of public goods (Marshall, 2017):

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 - ▶ Material legitimacy: focused on results (exercise of power)
4. Exercise of power and provision of public goods (Marshall, 2017):
 - ▶ Evaluation based on Inputs: quality of decision making
 - ▶ Evaluation based on Outputs: citizens satisfaction with results

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 - ▶ Quality of public administration and satisfaction with democracy (Ariely, 2013; Vigoda-Gadot, 2010)
 - ▶ Corruption and satisfaction with democracy (Stockemer and Sundström, 2014; Seligson, 2002; Weitz-Shapiro, 2008)
 - ▶ Political mechanism for deciding local public goods (Olken, 2010)
 - ▶ Education quality (Borman et al., 2012; Edelstein, 2011; Reid, 2002; Garcia-Bedolla, 2012)
 - ▶ Health care provision (Judge and Solomon, 1993; He, 2018; Thomson et al., 2010)
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3. Global issues and the provision of long-term political goods have been part of the discussion:
 - ▶ Peace and democracy (Burnell, 2018)
 - ▶ Political goods and democratic values (Bratton and Lewis, 2007; Bratton and Mattes, 2001)
 - ▶ Quality of environmental goods (Halla et al., 2013)


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Hypotheses

1. Citizen satisfaction with the provision of public goods will be linked with democratic legitimacy from the input-output perspective (politics and policies)
2. Democratic legitimacy will be also associated with citizen satisfaction through the formal aspects of the political system in which public goods are produced (polity)

Literature Review

Figure 3. Concept diagram of democratic legitimacy. *Source:* Authors' elaboration



Data and Empirical Strategy

Data and Empirical Strategy

Data

- ▶ Empirical study used individual-level data from the AmericasBarometer survey
- ▶ It focused on 18 Latin American countries that were included in the 2016/2017 wave of LAPOP survey
- ▶ Democracy Index 2017 was used to classify the countries according to their democratic regime

Data and Empirical Strategy

Empirical Strategy

1. Categorical variables built from a Likert scale: Ordered probit model

$$y_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{If } y_i^* < \alpha_1 \\ 2 & \text{If } \alpha_1 \leq y_i^* < \alpha_2 \\ \vdots & \\ m & \text{If } y_i^* \geq \alpha_{m-1} \end{cases}$$

$$y_i^* = X\beta + C\phi + W\gamma + P\pi + Z\theta + D\delta + \varepsilon_i$$

Dependent variable: satisfaction with democracy and support for the political system, and valuation of democracy

2. Binary responses linked to two direct measures of democratic legitimacy: Probit model

$$P(y_i = 1|X, C, W, P, Z, D) = \Phi(X\beta + C\phi + W\gamma + P\pi + Z\theta + D\delta)$$

Dependent variable: dummy variable that takes the value of one if the respondent does not justify a coup in times of uncontrolled crime and pervasive corruption

Data and Empirical Strategy

Empirical Strategy

Where:

- ▶ X : vector of explanatory variables that measure citizen satisfaction with the provision of traditional or local public goods: Streets, roads, and highways (question SD2NEW), public schools (question SD3NEW), and medical and health services (question SD6NEW)
- ▶ C : Citizen perceptions of corrupt behavior among politicians (question EXC7NEW), public officials (question EXC6), police officers (question EXC2), and soldiers or military officers (question EXC20)
- ▶ W : Covariates that widen the definition of public goods to political and global goods related to universal values and civil liberties, such as freedom of the press (question LIB1), freedom of speech (question LIB2B), the protection of citizens' basic rights (question B3), human rights protection (question LIB4), fair trial guarantee (question B1), and the seriousness of climate change (question ENV2B)
- ▶ P : Regressors related to political interest (question POL1) and political leanings (question L1)
- ▶ Z : Vector of control covariates, such as age, years of schooling, household's economic situation, and dummy variables that controlled for gender, indigeneity, and rurality
- ▶ D : Vector of country-specific dummy variables

Main Findings and Discussion

Table 3. Ordered probit estimates for citizen satisfaction with democracy

		Regime types:			
	All countries (1)	Full democracies (2)	Flawed democracies (3)	Hybrid regimes (4)	Authoritarian regimes (5)
Satisfaction with public goods:					
<i>Streets, roads, and highways</i>	0.1624*** (0.013)	0.1895*** (0.056)	0.1634*** (0.017)	0.1664*** (0.029)	0.1503*** (0.053)
<i>Public schools</i>	0.1509*** (0.014)	0.1698*** (0.058)	0.1389*** (0.017)	0.1867*** (0.030)	0.1283** (0.056)
<i>Medical and health services</i>	0.1685*** (0.013)	0.0883 (0.056)	0.1527*** (0.016)	0.2463*** (0.027)	0.1005* (0.053)
Satisfaction with political and global goods:					
<i>Freedom of the press</i>	0.0004 (0.011)	-0.0542 (0.063)	-0.0024 (0.014)	-0.0144 (0.022)	0.1081* (0.058)
<i>Freedom of speech</i>	0.0873*** (0.013)	0.2311*** (0.066)	0.0745*** (0.015)	0.0860*** (0.026)	0.1011* (0.057)
<i>Protection of citizens' basic rights</i>	0.0936*** (0.006)	0.1295*** (0.031)	0.0904*** (0.008)	0.1008*** (0.012)	0.0481* (0.026)
<i>Human rights protection</i>	0.1174*** (0.014)	0.1571** (0.062)	0.1028*** (0.017)	0.1265*** (0.030)	0.1736*** (0.067)
<i>Fair trial guarantee</i>	0.0576*** (0.006)	0.0205 (0.032)	0.0577*** (0.008)	0.0390*** (0.012)	0.1029*** (0.025)
<i>Seriousness of climate change</i>	-0.0213* (0.012)	0.0134 (0.060)	-0.0276* (0.015)	-0.0174 (0.025)	0.0072 (0.048)

Table 3. (cont.)

		Regime types:			
	All countries (1)	Full democracies (2)	Flawed democracies (3)	Hybrid regimes (4)	Authoritarian regimes (5)
Citizen perception of corrupt behavior:					
<i>Among politicians</i>	-0.1047*** (0.009)	-0.1888*** (0.039)	-0.1001*** (0.011)	-0.0936*** (0.017)	-0.1259*** (0.035)
<i>Among public servants</i>	-0.0321 (0.036)	0.1432 (0.239)	-0.0138 (0.049)	-0.0771 (0.062)	-0.0177 (0.108)
<i>Among police officers</i>	-0.0749*** (0.028)	-0.1354 (0.269)	-0.0953*** (0.036)	-0.0688 (0.049)	0.0509 (0.105)
<i>Among soldiers or military officers</i>	0.0185 (0.051)	0.3970 (0.867)	0.0022 (0.079)	0.1233 (0.083)	-0.0853 (0.114)
Political attitudes:					
<i>Political leanings</i>	0.0075** (0.003)	-0.0672*** (0.016)	0.0075* (0.004)	0.0221*** (0.006)	0.0214* (0.012)
<i>Political interest</i>	0.0348*** (0.009)	0.0592 (0.037)	0.0143 (0.011)	0.0791*** (0.018)	0.0193 (0.032)

Table 3. (cont.)

	All countries (1)	Regime types:			Authoritarian regimes (5)
		Full democracies (2)	Flawed democracies (3)	Hybrid regimes (4)	
Control variables:					
<i>Gender</i> (Female = 1)	-0.0727*** (0.017)	-0.1267 (0.077)	-0.0883*** (0.021)	-0.0164 (0.034)	-0.1169* (0.068)
<i>Age</i>	-0.0005 (0.001)	0.0033 (0.002)	-0.0019*** (0.001)	0.0012 (0.001)	0.0047** (0.002)
<i>Years of schooling</i>	-0.0116*** (0.002)	0.0111 (0.011)	-0.0082*** (0.003)	-0.0199*** (0.004)	-0.0147 (0.009)
<i>Household's economic situation</i>	0.0461*** (0.010)	0.1139** (0.053)	0.0471*** (0.013)	0.0258 (0.021)	0.0629 (0.045)
<i>Indigeneity</i> (Indigenous people = 1)	0.1184*** (0.030)	0.0573 (0.265)	0.0728* (0.041)	0.2016*** (0.049)	-0.0347 (0.179)
<i>Rurality</i> (Yes = 1)	0.1171*** (0.019)	-0.2033 (0.152)	0.1065*** (0.024)	0.1423*** (0.036)	0.1393 (0.120)
α_1	0.7096***	-0.0215	0.5115***	0.7344***	0.8544**
α_2	2.2667***	1.4913***	2.0739***	2.3563***	2.3267***
α_3	3.7079***	3.5468***	3.4427***	3.9258***	3.3480***
Observations	18,985	1,031	12,120	4,642	1,192
Log likelihood	-19,946	-928.6	-12,858	-4,723	-1,275
Pseudo R^2	0.109	0.142	0.088	0.122	0.115
χ^2 statistic	3,740	275.7	1,921	984.8	306.1

Table 4. Ordered probit estimates for citizen support for the political system

		Regime types:			
	All countries (1)	Full democracies (2)	Flawed democracies (3)	Hybrid regimes (4)	Authoritarian regimes (5)
Satisfaction with public goods:					
<i>Streets, roads, and highways</i>	0.0453*** (0.012)	0.0591 (0.051)	0.0552*** (0.014)	0.0181 (0.024)	0.0458 (0.050)
<i>Public schools</i>	0.0566*** (0.012)	0.0495 (0.054)	0.0512*** (0.015)	0.0454* (0.026)	0.0892* (0.052)
<i>Medical and health services</i>	0.0281** (0.011)	0.0228 (0.051)	0.0039 (0.014)	0.0763*** (0.024)	0.0723 (0.049)
Satisfaction with political and global goods:					
<i>Freedom of the press</i>	0.0553*** (0.011)	0.0933 (0.060)	0.0338*** (0.013)	0.0693*** (0.021)	0.1673*** (0.058)
<i>Freedom of speech</i>	0.0656*** (0.012)	0.0227 (0.065)	0.0533*** (0.015)	0.0714*** (0.026)	0.1072* (0.056)
<i>Protection of citizens' basic rights</i>	0.2097*** (0.006)	0.2848*** (0.031)	0.2157*** (0.008)	0.1744*** (0.012)	0.2133*** (0.025)
<i>Human rights protection</i>	-0.0361*** (0.013)	-0.0777 (0.058)	-0.0475*** (0.016)	-0.0374 (0.027)	0.0339 (0.061)
<i>Fair trial guarantee</i>	0.1048*** (0.006)	0.1120*** (0.032)	0.1053*** (0.008)	0.0865*** (0.012)	0.1099*** (0.025)
<i>Seriousness of climate change</i>	0.0468*** (0.012)	0.0711 (0.056)	0.0433*** (0.014)	0.0498** (0.024)	0.0563 (0.047)

Table 4. (cont.)

	All countries (1)	Full democracies (2)	Flawed democracies (3)	Hybrid regimes (4)	Authoritarian regimes (5)
Regime types:					
Citizen perception of corrupt behavior:					
<i>Among politicians</i>	-0.1008*** (0.008)	-0.1886*** (0.039)	-0.0979*** (0.011)	-0.0688*** (0.016)	-0.1541*** (0.037)
<i>Among public servants</i>	-0.0679* (0.035)	-0.1015 (0.247)	-0.1028** (0.046)	0.0227 (0.061)	-0.0403 (0.116)
<i>Among police officers</i>	-0.0395 (0.026)	-0.0645 (0.198)	-0.0070 (0.034)	-0.1207*** (0.046)	-0.0644 (0.111)
<i>Among soldiers or military officers</i>	-0.0528 (0.051)	0.2797 (0.540)	-0.0237 (0.076)	-0.0813 (0.088)	0.0944 (0.121)
Political attitudes:					
<i>Political leanings</i>	0.0130*** (0.003)	-0.0639*** (0.016)	0.0299*** (0.004)	0.0102* (0.006)	-0.0140 (0.013)
<i>Political interest</i>	0.1161*** (0.008)	0.1998*** (0.037)	0.1057*** (0.011)	0.1292*** (0.017)	0.0826** (0.033)

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	All countries (1)	Full democracies (2)	Flawed democracies (3)	Hybrid regimes (4)	Authoritarian regimes (5)
Regime types:					
Control variables:					
<i>Gender</i> (Female = 1)	0.0403** (0.016)	-0.0341 (0.073)	0.0495** (0.020)	0.0262 (0.032)	0.1028 (0.066)
<i>Age</i>	-0.0001 (0.001)	0.0059*** (0.002)	-0.0005 (0.001)	-0.0027** (0.001)	0.0046* (0.002)
<i>Years of schooling</i>	-0.0067*** (0.002)	-0.0183 (0.011)	-0.0093*** (0.003)	0.0006 (0.004)	-0.0220** (0.009)
<i>Household's economic situation</i>	0.0027 (0.010)	-0.0011 (0.048)	0.0035 (0.012)	-0.0217 (0.020)	0.0636 (0.045)
<i>Indigeneity</i> (Indigenous people = 1)	-0.0208 (0.029)	0.0592 (0.247)	-0.0155 (0.039)	-0.0447 (0.047)	0.2412 (0.158)
<i>Rurality</i> (Yes = 1)	0.0321* (0.018)	-0.1042 (0.135)	0.0450** (0.022)	0.0156 (0.034)	0.1529 (0.117)
α_1	0.1479	-0.0384	0.0403	-0.2003	1.0866***
α_2	0.5588***	0.3171	0.4778***	0.1871	1.4334***
α_3	0.9812***	0.8205*	0.9086***	0.6045***	1.8062***
α_4	1.4623***	1.3920***	1.4061***	1.0575***	2.2105***
α_5	1.9862***	1.9889***	1.9449***	1.5647***	2.6132***
α_6	2.4626***	2.5216***	2.4294***	2.0528***	2.9134***
Observations	19,029	1,027	12,150	4,667	1,185
Log likelihood	-33,328	-1,621	-21,522	-8,146	-1,858
Pseudo R^2	0.086	0.125	0.081	0.063	0.128
χ^2 statistic	4,645	372	2,962	886.3	427.1

Table 5. Ordered probit estimates for citizen valuation of democracy

		Regime types:			
	All countries (1)	Full democracies (2)	Flawed democracies (3)	Hybrid regimes (4)	Authoritarian regimes (5)
Satisfaction with public goods:					
<i>Streets, roads, and highways</i>	0.0091 (0.012)	0.0002 (0.054)	0.0052 (0.014)	0.0146 (0.024)	0.0319 (0.048)
<i>Public schools</i>	0.0152 (0.012)	0.0180 (0.056)	0.0170 (0.015)	0.0175 (0.026)	0.0213 (0.051)
<i>Medical and health services</i>	-0.0022 (0.011)	0.0410 (0.053)	-0.0095 (0.014)	0.0183 (0.023)	-0.0513 (0.047)
Satisfaction with political and global goods:					
<i>Freedom of the press</i>	0.0372*** (0.010)	-0.0422 (0.059)	0.0495*** (0.013)	0.0349* (0.020)	-0.0133 (0.053)
<i>Freedom of speech</i>	0.0365*** (0.012)	0.1251* (0.066)	0.0365** (0.014)	0.0276 (0.024)	0.0762 (0.052)
<i>Protection of citizens' basic rights</i>	0.0550*** (0.006)	0.1132*** (0.030)	0.0567*** (0.007)	0.0534*** (0.012)	0.0208 (0.024)
<i>Human rights protection</i>	0.0552*** (0.013)	0.0712 (0.061)	0.0482*** (0.016)	0.0881*** (0.027)	-0.0156 (0.064)
<i>Fair trial guarantee</i>	0.0496*** (0.006)	-0.0363 (0.030)	0.0610*** (0.008)	0.0513*** (0.012)	0.0127 (0.023)
<i>Seriousness of climate change</i>	0.1436*** (0.011)	0.1337** (0.060)	0.1582*** (0.014)	0.1324*** (0.023)	0.0680* (0.040)

Table 5. (cont.)

		Regime types:			
	All countries (1)	Full democracies (2)	Flawed democracies (3)	Hybrid regimes (4)	Authoritarian regimes (5)
Citizen perception of corrupt behavior:					
<i>Among politicians</i>	-0.0516*** (0.008)	-0.0808** (0.038)	-0.0414*** (0.010)	-0.0554*** (0.016)	-0.0912*** (0.035)
<i>Among public servants</i>	0.0402 (0.035)	-0.0455 (0.240)	0.0439 (0.047)	0.0887 (0.061)	-0.0403 (0.106)
<i>Among police officers</i>	-0.0299 (0.026)	-0.1364 (0.217)	-0.0454 (0.033)	-0.0464 (0.044)	0.1431 (0.102)
<i>Among soldiers or military officers</i>	-0.0985** (0.049)	0.0146 (0.941)	0.0166 (0.071)	-0.2111*** (0.082)	-0.1663 (0.117)
Political attitudes:					
<i>Political leanings</i>	0.0143*** (0.003)	-0.0458*** (0.015)	0.0131*** (0.004)	0.0184*** (0.006)	0.0329*** (0.012)
<i>Political interest</i>	0.1267*** (0.008)	0.1162*** (0.039)	0.1440*** (0.011)	0.0811*** (0.017)	0.1081*** (0.032)

Table 5. (cont.)

	All countries (1)	Full democracies (2)	Flawed democracies (3)	Hybrid regimes (4)	Authoritarian regimes (5)
Regime types:					
Control variables:					
<i>Gender</i> (Female = 1)	-0.0580*** (0.016)	0.0150 (0.074)	-0.0515*** (0.019)	-0.0812*** (0.031)	-0.1069* (0.064)
<i>Age</i>	0.0095*** (0.001)	0.0137*** (0.002)	0.0079*** (0.001)	0.0093*** (0.001)	0.0212*** (0.002)
<i>Years of schooling</i>	0.0413*** (0.002)	0.0802*** (0.013)	0.0421*** (0.003)	0.0373*** (0.004)	0.0275*** (0.009)
<i>Household's economic situation</i>	0.0384*** (0.010)	0.0357 (0.046)	0.0404*** (0.012)	0.0224 (0.019)	0.0787* (0.041)
<i>Indigeneity</i> (Indigenous people = 1)	-0.0283 (0.027)	0.1521 (0.245)	-0.0220 (0.038)	-0.0560 (0.043)	-0.1484 (0.179)
<i>Rurality</i> (Yes = 1)	-0.0079 (0.018)	-0.1804 (0.141)	-0.0363* (0.022)	0.0394 (0.033)	0.1161 (0.107)
α_1	0.6472***	0.1913	0.7106***	0.3891**	0.4640
α_2	1.0177***	0.5327	1.0984***	0.7910***	0.6619**
α_3	1.4749***	0.8805**	1.5783***	1.2501***	0.9684***
α_4	2.1081***	1.4448***	2.2139***	1.9266***	1.4735***
α_5	2.7120***	1.9478***	2.8399***	2.5599***	1.8626***
α_6	3.2056***	2.5144***	3.3346***	3.0957***	2.2285***
Observations	18,994	1,026	12,141	4,643	1,184
Log likelihood	-33,285	-1,364	-21,385	-8,287	-2,037
Pseudo R^2	0.044	0.072	0.041	0.027	0.036
χ^2 statistic	2,654	189.3	1,541	418.2	158.8

Table 6. Marginal effects after probit estimation for democratic legitimacy (uncontrolled crime)

	All	Regime types:			
	countries	Full	Flawed	Hybrid	Authoritarian
	(1)	democracies	democracies	regimes	regimes
		(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Satisfaction with public goods:					
<i>Streets, roads, and highways</i>	0.0124* (0.007)	-0.0205 (0.025)	0.0154* (0.009)	0.0132 (0.016)	0.0141 (0.032)
<i>Public schools</i>	-0.0154** (0.008)	0.0185 (0.027)	-0.0154 (0.010)	-0.0232 (0.017)	-0.0239 (0.032)
<i>Medical and health services</i>	-0.0036 (0.007)	0.0077 (0.027)	-0.0050 (0.009)	-0.0028 (0.015)	0.0069 (0.033)
Satisfaction with political and global goods:					
<i>Freedom of the press</i>	0.0080 (0.007)	-0.0306 (0.030)	0.0110 (0.008)	-0.0068 (0.014)	0.0857** (0.037)
<i>Freedom of speech</i>	0.0089 (0.008)	0.0109 (0.032)	0.0094 (0.009)	0.0102 (0.016)	-0.0168 (0.036)
<i>Protection of citizens' basic rights</i>	0.0062* (0.004)	0.0189 (0.015)	0.0069 (0.004)	0.0026 (0.007)	-0.0024 (0.015)
<i>Human rights protection</i>	-0.0020 (0.008)	0.0170 (0.030)	0.0004 (0.010)	-0.0081 (0.018)	-0.0527 (0.040)
<i>Fair trial guarantee</i>	-0.0000 (0.004)	0.0019 (0.014)	0.0008 (0.005)	-0.0073 (0.007)	0.0103 (0.015)
<i>Seriousness of climate change</i>	0.0104 (0.007)	0.0004 (0.028)	0.0019 (0.009)	0.0290* (0.016)	0.0567** (0.028)

Table 6. (cont.)

		Regime types:			
	All countries (1)	Full democracies (2)	Flawed democracies (3)	Hybrid regimes (4)	Authoritarian regimes (5)
Citizen perception of corrupt behavior:					
<i>Among politicians</i>	-0.0257*** (0.005)	-0.0329* (0.020)	-0.0180*** (0.007)	-0.0319*** (0.010)	-0.0548** (0.024)
<i>Among public servants</i>	-0.0115 (0.022)	-0.0943 (0.147)	0.0086 (0.028)	-0.0147 (0.042)	-0.0453 (0.073)
<i>Among police officers</i>	-0.0818*** (0.018)	0.1147* (0.059)	-0.0884*** (0.023)	-0.0717** (0.032)	-0.1450** (0.068)
<i>Among soldiers or military officers</i>	-0.0237 (0.030)	-0.4255 (0.290)	-0.0027 (0.043)	-0.0171 (0.053)	0.0169 (0.070)
Political attitudes:					
<i>Political leanings</i>	-0.0040** (0.002)	-0.0316*** (0.008)	-0.0029 (0.003)	-0.0008 (0.004)	0.0025 (0.008)
<i>Political interest</i>	0.0220*** (0.005)	0.0421** (0.018)	0.0218*** (0.007)	0.0030 (0.011)	0.0451** (0.021)

Table 6. (cont.)

		Regime types:			
	All countries (1)	Full democracies (2)	Flawed democracies (3)	Hybrid regimes (4)	Authoritarian regimes (5)
Control variables:					
<i>Gender</i> (Female = 1)	-0.0502*** (0.010)	-0.0986*** (0.038)	-0.0434*** (0.013)	-0.0436** (0.022)	-0.0755* (0.043)
<i>Age</i>	0.0050*** (0.000)	0.0066*** (0.001)	0.0042*** (0.000)	0.0057*** (0.001)	0.0074*** (0.002)
<i>Years of schooling</i>	0.0148*** (0.001)	0.0267*** (0.006)	0.0149*** (0.002)	0.0132*** (0.003)	0.0071 (0.006)
<i>Household's economic situation</i>	0.0143** (0.006)	0.0287 (0.024)	0.0115 (0.008)	0.0114 (0.013)	0.0343 (0.028)
<i>Indigeneity</i> (Indigenous people = 1)	-0.0032 (0.020)	0.0530 (0.090)	-0.0381 (0.026)	0.0461 (0.032)	0.0172 (0.108)
<i>Rurality</i> (Yes = 1)	0.0076 (0.012)	0.0991* (0.051)	-0.0027 (0.015)	0.0177 (0.023)	0.0727 (0.064)
Observations	9,606	506	6,277	2,249	574
Log likelihood	-6,061	-228.4	-4,023	-1,418	-340.9
Pseudo R^2	0.059	0.208	0.051	0.059	0.098
χ^2 statistic	743.8	104.2	429.7	171.8	74.30

Table 7. Marginal effects after probit estimation for democratic legitimacy (massive corruption)

		Regime types:			
	All countries (1)	Full democracies (2)	Flawed democracies (3)	Hybrid regimes (4)	Authoritarian regimes (5)
Satisfaction with public goods:					
<i>Streets, roads, and highways</i>	0.0007 (0.008)	0.0379 (0.027)	-0.0082 (0.010)	0.0117 (0.015)	-0.0085 (0.028)
<i>Public schools</i>	-0.0028 (0.008)	-0.0033 (0.029)	-0.0106 (0.010)	0.0102 (0.016)	0.0488 (0.031)
<i>Medical and health services</i>	-0.0011 (0.007)	0.0254 (0.025)	-0.0082 (0.009)	0.0105 (0.015)	0.0030 (0.029)
Satisfaction with political and global goods:					
<i>Freedom of the press</i>	0.0024 (0.007)	-0.0296 (0.030)	0.0025 (0.009)	0.0040 (0.014)	0.0328 (0.040)
<i>Freedom of speech</i>	0.0365*** (0.008)	-0.0163 (0.034)	0.0323*** (0.010)	0.0519*** (0.016)	0.0235 (0.037)
<i>Protection of citizens' basic rights</i>	0.0128*** (0.004)	0.0180 (0.014)	0.0136*** (0.005)	0.0072 (0.007)	0.0058 (0.014)
<i>Human rights protection</i>	-0.0065 (0.008)	-0.0129 (0.028)	-0.0057 (0.011)	-0.0031 (0.017)	-0.0405 (0.041)
<i>Fair trial guarantee</i>	0.0029 (0.004)	0.0130 (0.015)	0.0040 (0.005)	-0.0040 (0.007)	-0.0002 (0.014)
<i>Seriousness of climate change</i>	-0.0088 (0.008)	0.0909*** (0.033)	-0.0091 (0.009)	-0.0201 (0.015)	-0.0134 (0.028)

Table 7. (cont.)

	All countries (1)	Regime types:			
		Full democracies (2)	Flawed democracies (3)	Hybrid regimes (4)	Authoritarian regimes (5)
Citizen perception of corrupt behavior:					
<i>Among politicians</i>	-0.0228*** (0.006)	-0.0525*** (0.020)	-0.0249*** (0.007)	-0.0114 (0.010)	-0.0228 (0.022)
<i>Among public servants</i>	-0.0263 (0.022)	-0.3690* (0.212)	-0.0217 (0.031)	-0.0412 (0.038)	0.0354 (0.062)
<i>Among police officers</i>	-0.0275 (0.017)	-0.0853 (0.124)	-0.0213 (0.023)	-0.0396 (0.030)	-0.0619 (0.065)
<i>Among soldiers or military officers</i>	-0.0276 (0.031)		-0.0607 (0.049)	-0.0104 (0.051)	0.0009 (0.070)
Political attitudes:					
<i>Political leanings</i>	-0.0032 (0.002)	-0.0314*** (0.008)	-0.0020 (0.003)	-0.0000 (0.004)	0.0040 (0.007)
<i>Political interest</i>	0.0159*** (0.005)	0.0670*** (0.019)	0.0108 (0.007)	0.0104 (0.011)	0.0138 (0.020)

Table 7. (cont.)

	All countries (1)	Regime types:			
		Full democracies (2)	Flawed democracies (3)	Hybrid regimes (4)	Authoritarian regimes (5)
Control variables:					
<i>Gender</i> (Female = 1)	-0.0335*** (0.011)	0.0055 (0.039)	-0.0280** (0.014)	-0.0435** (0.021)	-0.0722* (0.041)
<i>Age</i>	0.0041*** (0.000)	0.0032*** (0.001)	0.0043*** (0.000)	0.0034*** (0.001)	0.0047*** (0.001)
<i>Years of schooling</i>	0.0117*** (0.001)	0.0298*** (0.007)	0.0124*** (0.002)	0.0097*** (0.003)	0.0032 (0.006)
<i>Household's economic situation</i>	0.0286*** (0.006)	0.0185 (0.026)	0.0369*** (0.008)	0.0088 (0.013)	0.0171 (0.028)
<i>Indigeneity</i> (Indigenous people = 1)	0.0152 (0.019)	0.1628*** (0.051)	-0.0110 (0.026)	0.0420 (0.030)	-0.0682 (0.126)
<i>Rurality</i> (Yes = 1)	0.0028 (0.012)	0.0635 (0.060)	-0.0190 (0.016)	0.0351 (0.022)	0.0804 (0.067)
Observations	8,918	511	5,575	2,253	579
Log likelihood	-5,575	-231.8	-3,525	-1,415	-345.8
Pseudo R^2	0.053	0.211	0.055	0.043	0.045
χ^2 statistic	600	97.1	386.8	123.8	30.79

Conclusions

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2. Evidence confirmed that democratic legitimacy in Latin America can be reinforced by a higher satisfaction with political/global public goods, interestingly, when considering both direct and indirect measures.
3. Higher levels of corruption among politicians, public officials, and police contribute to weaken regime legitimacy in Latin America.
4. Evidence from direct and indirect measures confirmed that democratic legitimacy is lower among Latin American women.

Thank you